A tragic militant attack in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22 left at least 26 people dead [11], including Indian and foreign tourists. The incident prompted an immediate and strong response from the Indian government, which has blamed the attack on Pakistan-based groups. Within a day, India announced that it was suspending [12] the Indus Waters Treaty [13]—a World Bank-brokered agreement signed in 1960 that governs the use and distribution of waters in the Indus River basin between the two countries.
India stated that the treaty would remain in abeyance [16] until Pakistan takes visible action against what it called cross-border terrorism. Pakistan has rejected the allegations, and condemned the move as a breach of international law. The country's National Security Committee [17] termed the suspension unacceptable, and Islamabad responded by expelling Indian military liaisons, closing its airspace to Indian craft, and stating its intention to raise the issue at international forums including the United Nations [18] and the International Court of Justice [19].
The Indus treaty [13] allocates the use of six rivers shared by the two countries. Under the pact, India has exclusive rights over the eastern tributaries of the Indus—the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej—while Pakistan controls the western tributaries—the Jhelum and Chenab—as well as the Indus itself. India is permitted limited non-consumptive use of the western rivers in territories it controls but cannot alter their flow. The treaty, under Article VIII, also created a Permanent Indus Commission [20] for joint oversight and dispute resolution.
Despite the turbulent relationship between India and Pakistan, the treaty has survived multiple conflicts. It continued to function even during the wars of 1965 [21], 1971 [22], and the Kargil conflict in 1999 [23]. This resilience is one reason why the treaty has often been held up as an example of successful cooperation between two adversarial nuclear neighbors.
However, the treaty includes no provision for unilateral suspension or termination. In fact, the agreement clearly states that the treaty shall remain in force until modified or terminated by mutual agreement between both parties. Any such suspension, especially in response to a political or military incident, raises serious legal questions. The legal consequences of India's suspension are made clear by the treaty’s provisions. Article XII states that the treaty "shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments," while Annexure F and G state that disputes not resolved by the Permanent Indus Commission must be referred to a Neutral Expert or Court of Arbitration. Bypassing these mechanisms contradicts not only the text of the treaty but also international legal norms on dispute resolution.
From the perspective of customary international law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [24] provides further clarity. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention codifies the principle of pacta sunt servanda, requiring that every treaty in force must be adhered to in good faith. Article 60, which deals with termination or suspension due to breach, limits such remedies to cases of material violation—typically adjudicated through international forums. Neither process has been followed in this instance.
Following India's announcement, diplomatic tensions escalated. India, citing national security grounds, implemented restrictions on visas and cross-border access for Pakistani nationals. Pakistan responded [25] by halting trade, closing the Wagah border crossing, and suspending overflight rights. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar [26] publicly challenged India to provide evidence for its allegations, and described the Indus Treaty as an international legal instrument that cannot be set aside through executive action.
While these measures reflect diplomatic reciprocity, they also reveal how quickly the situation has escalated beyond a legal dispute into a full-blown diplomatic standoff. Pakistan has announced [27] its intention to pursue the matter through international forums, including the UN and the International Court of Justice.
From a legal perspective, India's move raises concerns about treaty obligations and compliance with the principles of international law. Unilateral suspension could undermine confidence in trans-boundary water agreements globally. India's position as an upper riparian in other river basins—such as the Brahmaputra [28] shared with China and Bangladesh—may also come under scrutiny if such actions become precedent.
The implications extend to water security within Pakistan. The western rivers are essential for agriculture, power generation, and public use. Disruption—whether in data sharing, flow predictability, or legal cooperation—introduces risks to resource planning and may intensify domestic inter-provincial tensions over water sharing.
The Indus Waters Treaty was designed to ensure cooperation through clear legal rules, outside mediation, and a shared understanding of water as a common resource. The present situation is one of the most serious challenges the treaty has faced. Since it does not allow for suspension by one side alone, any changes to its status should be made through mutual agreement or legal process.
Furthermore, the treaty's survival clause under Article IX establishes that in the event of a dispute, parties are obligated to maintain normal implementation of the treaty provisions unless and until a binding resolution is reached. India's unilateral action could thus be interpreted as a procedural as well as substantive breach, potentially triggering international review depending on how Pakistan frames its case at the ICJ or other legal platforms.
As both sides maintain hardened positions and diplomatic communications remain strained, the role of third-party facilitators, including the World Bank, may prove critical. Whether the treaty can continue to function as a stabilizing force will depend on adherence to legal mechanisms and the willingness of both countries to re-engage through peaceful channels.
—Abu Bakar Khan for JURIST [29], April 25. Used with permission.
See our last reports on the Pahalgam attack [30] and struggle for the Indus [31].
